I was reading this week’s Economist magazine and came across yet another article on Hungary, Viktor Orban, the nation’s PM, and his Fidesz party.
The article gives both criticism and praise and, to my surprise, also reiterates many of the things I’ve said (sometimes nauseatingly repetitively) – primarily about the vast divide between Hungary’s controlling Fidesz party and the rest of Europe – that their differences in mindset are so striking that there’s a serious divergence. My point has been that those in the Hungarian government don’t think like the rest of Europe and because of that, they appoint like-minded friends to government positions, creating this vast partisan army of followers who are all thinking contrary to European principles.
Now, to Orban’s credit, he’s trying to unseat eight years of total corruption. As a columnist recently wrote in this op-ed,
… I hear more lurid and unprintable tales about corruption in state-owned industries. I feel sorry for the ordinary decent Hungarians who try to work hard, pay their taxes and raise their children, while over their heads a gilded class of politician-tycoons have been siphoning off money. It strikes me that the polarisation is not just a vertical one between left and right, but a horizontal one between the governed and the governers. It is that feeling of dispossession that stokes protest parties, both the mildly green LMP, but also the thuggish Jobbik.
According to the article,
Outsiders are worried about Hungary. Ever since Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party won two-thirds of the parliamentary seats in April’s general election, the signals have been ominous. First Mr Orban extended the right to citizenship to all ethnic Magyars living beyond the country’s borders. Critics heard sinister echoes of revanchism in that.
Then the new prime minister started replacing the leaders of public institutions and agencies with his party pals. Targets ranged from the elections committee to the national audit office, from the financial regulator to the presidency of the country. Mr Orban’s predecessors are not safe either: the new anti-corruption commissioner says two previous prime ministers committed perjury. (Both deny the allegations.)
Next came a ham-fisted attempt to build support for reform by drawing attention to Hungary’s economic problems. In early June a spokesman for Mr Orban said it “wouldn’t be an exaggeration” to speak of default. Predictably, the forint tumbled and bond yields spiked.
A few weeks later, the government passed a tough media law, much criticised by press-freedom watchdogs, that increased official oversight of public and private broadcasters. Krisztian Szabados of Political Capital, a private research outfit, reckons that Mr Orban and his allies now control, directly or indirectly, 80% of Hungary’s media.
The loudest alarm came three weeks ago, after Mr Orban’s government broke off talks with the IMF and the European Union over renewal of a €20 billion ($26 billion) loan package. Hungary’s debt is the highest in the region, at over 70% of GDP.
This could turn nasty. Rating agencies have put Hungary’s debt close to junk status.
Yet a lot of the gloom-mongering is partisan, and too forgiving of the dire political and economic legacy of Hungary’s previous, ex-communist, rulers. Mr Orban has a strong political mandate for cleaning house. A wholesale purge of the former regime’s appointees is indeed messy, but in Hungary’s winner-takes-all political system, it is not of itself outrageous.
Moreover, Hungary’s economy can withstand some wobbles. The current account is in surplus; unemployment is dropping and industrial production rising; government bond sales have been strong. Barring upsets, Hungary can manage, for this year at least, without the IMF and EU.
The real worry is over Mr Orban’s headstrong ways and cliquish habits. These hampered his last stint in power… and seem to have worsened since then. Moreover, EU membership and jittery financial markets now impose new constraints. Even supporters doubt if Mr Orban understands the game’s new rules. His tantrum at the IMF, as well as chilly encounters with sympathetic figures, such as the European Commission president, José Manuel Barroso, and Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, highlight the gulf in understanding. It needs to be bridged soon.
Viktor Orban’s previous reign as the Hungarian PM (1998-2002) made him a pariah, disliked across Europe, and put him at odds with the U.S. For the last eight years though, he’s been sitting back, watching as Hungary fell deeper and deeper into turmoil, not just financially, and/or politically, but morally. He has watched Hungary allow foreign banks to loan money in foreign currency (meaning the payment amount fluctuates based on the exchange rate; very bad when your currency in plummeting). He has watched unemployment skyrocket. He watched the media turn into more sensationalized slander than news reporting. He has watched political corruption grow to levels unfathomable in the Western world. And all the while, he has been plotting and strategizing – for the last 3 years especially, as the previous Socialist MSZP party has been lame duck.
He knew he would win in April. The question was by how much. In the end, he controlled over two-thirds of the parliament and the winner-take-all Hungarian political system means he can do whatever, to whomever, at any time, for any reason. He can change the constitution, change/amend/nullify laws, appoint puppets and friends to positions of authority, and create new government entities, just to name a few.
As is the case with the new media control organization, of which its head is appointed to a nine-year term by the PM and of its governing board, 6 are appointed from parliament, and 2 others are appointed by the head of the organization. It doesn’t take a much intelligence to quickly see that, at all times, no matter what, Orban will be in control of the media, especially if he controls parliament by the majority he has now. Even if his party loses parliamentary seats in four years, he’ll still have control.
As long as Orban has the power he has now, he can restructure government to suit his own needs. And by appointing diehard loyalists, he’s securing his future.
But change was needed for sure. When you consider that 1.5% of GDP in Hungary is affected by corruption (65-70% of all government contracts), it’s a safe bet to assume everyone is corrupt at some level, which is how the recent corruption witch hunt became a reality. No doubt it was needed – and maybe bending over backwards to go after a previous prime minister is justified – but this adds to the nationalist mentality that permeates Hungary right now. Nationalism can be good, but it can also grow to a boiling point. I’m not implying that’s the case in Hungary, but a look back through European history reiterates my point.
I’ve been told by countless people that Viktor Orban is a narcissist and a sociopath… that he believes he knows what’s best for Hungary more than anyone else… whether he actually does is irrelevant to him or his party followers. I have no idea if that’s true. The guy seems nice enough to me. And I have no doubt that everything he does is, in his mind at least, the best possible direction for Hungary.
But at what point does the need for change, and the subsequent changes, become detrimental? When do sweeping changes to national law and the legislative process create an autocracy more than a democracy? At what point does nationalism become an excuse or justification for other forms of corruption? And when will the rest of the world’s leaders back away from Hungary? I don’t know the answers to those questions. What I do know is that sweeping, total, unquestioned changes (and the power associated with that ability) are a recipe for disaster if not held in check. Hungary is on a slippery slope – but if things go well here, Hungary could once again be a symbol for the rest of Europe. A symbol that reform can be correctly implemented in a way to benefit politics, economics, national security, and foreign policy. We must not forget that 100 years ago Hungary was a benchmark of European society.
So now that he essentially has absolute power, what can be done to stop him if things get out of control? More importantly, who will have the audacity to speak up against him? In the current Hungarian political climate, just as it was in the US during the previous Bush Administration, speaking up against government is equated to treason more than it is political debate.
Hungary is refusing to follow European norms, is leveraging nationalism as a tool, is resisting international development, is using harsh tactics to go after former heads of state, has a created a political situation where, for the most part, there is no accountability, yet is meanwhile in the midst of a huge financial crisis, which directly impacts its EU-member brethren. The changes going on in Hungary are absolutely relevant to the rest of Europe, the US, as well as regional stability and security. What happens here, and how Viktor Orban is received by the rest of Europe’s leadership, to include the EU, affects the entire region.
